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The celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [2, 4] states that when there
are more than two candidates, any surjective social choice function which is
defined over the universal domain of preferences and is strategy-proof must be
dictatorial. Aswal, Chatterji and Sen generalize [1] the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem by showing that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem still holds if the
universal domain is replaced with the linked domain.
An election is a tuple E = (C, V ) where C is a set of candidates and V is a
multiset of votes each of which is defined as a linear order over C. Two candi-
dates a, b ∈ C in E are connected if there are two votes where one ranks a first
and b second, and the other ranks b first and a second. The election E is linked
if there is a linear order (c1, c2, . . . , cm) over C such that the first two candidates
in the order are connected and every other candidate is connected to at least two
candidates before him in the order [1], i.e., c1 and c2 are connected, and every
ci, i ≥ 3, is connected to at least two candidates in {c1, c2, . . . , ci−1}. In this
note, we show that determining whether an election is linked is polynomial-time
solvable.
Theorem 1. Determining whether an election is linked can be done in polyno-
mial time.
Proof. Let E = (C, V ) be an election. Let m = |C|. We create a graph G =
(V,A) as follows. For each candidate we create a vertex in V , and for each
pair of connected candidates a, b ∈ C we create an edge between a and b. So,
|V | = m. For a vertex c, N(c) is the set of neighbors of c. Clearly, this graph
can be constructed in polynomial time. The linked domain recognition problem
is equivalent to determining whether there is a linear order (cpi(1), . . . , cpi(m)) of
V such that there is an edge between the first two vertices, and every ith vertex
where i ≥ 3 has at least two neighbors in the first i − 1 vertices. We call this
order a linked order of G. The algorithm guesses the first two vertices, say a and
b. The order of a and b does not matter. Let cpi(1) = a, cpi(2) = b and S2 = {a, b}.
This breaks down the instance into m(m−1)2 subinstances. Then, we solve each
subintance by a greedy algorithm. In particular, for each i = 3, 4, . . . ,m, if
there is a candidate c ∈ C \ Si−1 such that |N(c) ∩ Si−1| ≥ 2, then we order
c after the current candidate, i.e., let cpi(i) = c, and set Si = Si−1 ∪ {c}. If
we find a linked order by doing so, then the subinstance is a Yes-instance.
Otherwise, the subinstance is a No-instance. The reason is as follows. Assume
1
that when the algorithm is executed at some i ∈ {3, 4, . . . ,m} every vertex
of C \ Si−1 has at most one neighbor in Si−1. For the sake of contradiction,
assume that there is a linked order (cpi′(1), . . . , cpi′(m)) such that cpi′(1) = a and
cpi′(2) = b. Let j be the smallest integer such that cpi′(j) ∈ C \ Si−1, i.e., cpi′(j)
is the first candidate among C \ Si−1 in the linked order. Clearly, j ≥ 3 and
{cpi′(1), . . . , cpi′(j−1)} ⊆ Si−1. However, according to our assumption, cpi′(j) has
at most one neighbor in {cpi′(1), . . . , cpi′(j−1)}, a contradiction.
Recently, Pramanik [3] studied β-domain which differs from linked domain in
that the connectedness condition is replaced with the weak connectedness condi-
tion. The above algorithm can be adapted to recognize β-domain in polynomial
time as well. The only difference is that for the same election the auxiliary graph
constructed in the algorithm may be (but not necessarily) different (in β-domain
there is an edge between two candidates if they are weakly connected).
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